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ABSTRACT
Mural mural on the wall, what’s the fairest use of them all? Many corporations have
taken advantage of public art to promote their own brand. Corporations commission
graffiti advertising campaigns because they create a spectacle that gains traction on
social media. The battle rages on between the independent artists who wish to protect
the exclusive rights over their art, against the corporations who argue that the public
art is fair game and digital advertising is fair use of art. The Eastern Market district
of Detroit is home to the Murals in the Market Festival. In January 2018, Mercedes
Benz obtained a permit from the City of Detroit to photograph its G 500 SUV in specific
downtown areas. On January 26, 2018, Mercedes posted six of these photographs on
its Instagram account. When Defendant-artists threatened to file suit, Mercedes
removed the photos from Instagram as a courtesy. In March 2019, Mercedes filed three
declaratory judgment actions against the artists for non-infringement. This Comment
will analyze the claims for relief put forth in Mercedes’ complaint and evaluate
Defendant-artists’ arguments. Ultimately, this Comment will propose how the court
should rule in the pending litigation of MBUSA LLC v. Lewis.
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MURAL MURAL ON THE WALL: REVISITING FAIR USE OF STREET ART
MADYLAN YARC*
I. INTRODUCTION
“Hopefully street art will stop being trendy. They say the quickest way to kill a
man’s ideas is to make him fashionable.”1 This commentary comes from Banksy, a
well-known graffiti artist and activist, about the trend and publicity of street art.2
The battle rages on between independent artists who are fighting to protect
exclusive rights over their public art, against corporations who argue that the public
art3 is fair game and digital advertising is fair use of art. Many companies use graffiti
advertising campaigns because they create a “spectacle” that gains traction on social
media.4 In 2018 Zippo Manufacturing Co. commissioned a 188,368 square-foot mural
that gained “over 11.5 million views across all web platforms.”5
Meanwhile many cities have begun mural projects to help revitalize their urban
downtown landscapes.6 The artists avoid criminal charges7 for graffiti8 and benefit
* © 2020 Madylan Yarc. Juris Doctorate Candidate, May 2021, at UIC John Marshall Law School;
B.A. in English Literature and History, Marquette University (2018).
1 David
Fear, Street (il)Legal: Q&A with Banksy, TIMEOUT.COM (Apr. 12, 2010),
https://www.timeout.com/newyork/film/street-il-legal-q-a-with-banksy.
2 Will
Ellsworth-Jones, The Story Behind Banksy, SMITHSONIAN.COM (Feb. 2013),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/the-story-behind-banksy-4310304/ (reporting that
Banksy is a “graffiti master, painter, activist, filmmaker and all-purpose provocateur-for its list of the
world’s 100 most influential people in 2010”).
3 Art, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining the word “art” as “[c]reative expression,
or the product of creative expression”).
4 Greg Ritchie, Luxury Brands Are Taking Over the Street Art Scene, BLOOMBERG (Jul. 22, 2019,
11:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-07-23/luxury-brands-gucci-louboutingraffiti-ads-take-over-street-art (noting that “[c]ompanies that were previously put off by graffiti’s
association with trespassing and criminal damage have realized the best street art can go viral on
social media, giving an image splashed on the wall of a back-street office block global impact”).
5 Ritchie, supra note 4.
6 Katherine Brooks, The 19 Best Cities To See Street Art In The United States, HUFFPOST (Dec. 6,
2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/street-art-american-cities_n_7594180 (noting that large
corporations aren’t the only ones taking advantage of the street art trend, many cities including
“Miami, Philadelphia, Seattle, St. Louis . . . and Detroit” have commissioned large murals for those
“vacationers who want to see some good art”).
7 Most states criminalize graffiti as vandalism under criminal mischief, intentional destruction
of property, or criminal trespass statutes. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-1 (2020); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/21-1.3 (2020) (“A person commits criminal defacement of property when the person knowingly
damages the property of another by defacing, deforming, or otherwise damaging the property by the
use of paint or any other similar substance.”); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 594, 594.1, 594.5 (Deering 2020)
(“(a) [e]very person who maliciously commits any of the following acts with respect to any real or
personal property not his or her own . . . is guilty of vandalism: (1) Defaces with graffiti or other
inscribed material”). Some cities have also adopted graffiti ordinances. See generally Wayne County,
Mich., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 158-3 (2020) (making graffiti a civil offense with fines starting at
$100.00).
8 Black’s Law Dictionary provides no definitions for the terms “graffiti,” “street art,” or “mural.”
Yet many of these terms are used interchangeably when discussing artwork on outdoor structures in
a spray-paint medium. Artist Paul Walsh explains that graffiti “involves letter-based tags and pieces,
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from the large-scale public display of their artwork, while the cities benefit from the
tourism with the added benefit of containing the aerosol artwork.
A. Factual History
In 2015 artists Jeff Soto and Maxx Gramajo created a mural as part of the annual
art festival, “Murals in the Market” (“Festival”).9 The Festival aims at revitalizing the
Eastern Market district of Detroit by increasing tourism, traffic, and economic
development.10 The Eastern Market district is a year-round public market that began
in the 1800s.11 The Soto-Gramajo mural was painted near the Gratiot Central Market
on the “façade of a building” and became a “permanent fixture of the Eastern Market's
cityscape.”12
In 2016 during the second year of the Festival, artist James Lewis created a mural
painted on the façade of a building near 2001 Wilkins Street.13 And in 2017 artist
Daniel Bombardier created a mural for the Festival painted in front of Mike's Coney
Island Restaurant.14

Image 1. Lewis Mural in downtown Detroit.

sometimes with characters / backgrounds as well” and “is usually created without permission.” In
contrast, murals are usually commissioned and the painting “typically cover[s] the entire wall.”
Whereas the term street art describes a style of anonymous artwork “rendered in public spaces using
stencils, spray[-]paint, acrylic paint, stickers and a range of other appropriated mediums.” Paul
Walsh, ‘Mural’ vs. ‘Graffiti’ vs. ‘Street Art’: my definitions., PAUL X WALSH (Feb. 21, 2018),
https://paulwalsh.co.nz/mural-vs-graffiti-vs-street-art-my-definitions/.
9 Mercedes Benz, USA, LLC v. Lewis, No. 19-10948, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154818, at *5 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 11, 2019).
10 See About, MURALS IN THE MARKET, https://www.muralsinthemarket.com/about (last visited
Oct. 2019).
11 See Building the Market, EASTERN MARKET, https://www.easternmarket.org/district/buildingthe-market (last visited Oct. 2019).
12 Lewis, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154818, at *4.
13 Id.
14 Id.
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In January 2018, Mercedes Benz USA, LLC (“Mercedes”) obtained a permit from
the City of Detroit to photograph its G 500 SUV in specific downtown areas.15 On

Image 2. Mercedes Benz Instagram Post.

January 26, 2018, Mercedes posted six of those photos on its Instagram account,
@mercedesbenz.16 After the mural-artists threatened to file suit, Mercedes removed
the photos from Instagram as a courtesy.17 In March 2019, Mercedes filed three
declaratory judgment actions against the artists for non-infringement.18
B. Procedural History
In its complaint, Mercedes sought the following declaratory judgments: (1) the
Instagram post depicting Defendants’ murals do not infringe Defendants’ alleged
copyright; (2) Mercedes made fair use of the murals; (3) the murals are exempt from
protection under the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act (“AWCPA”); and
(4) Mercedes did not violate the prohibition under the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (“DMCA”) for intentionally removing or altering copyright management
information.19

15 Id. at *3-4 (explaining that the permit “authorized Mercedes to photograph its G 500 in several
locations, including the area between the Eastern Market and 1314 Gratiot Avenue, where
defendants' murals are located”).
16 Id.
17 Complaint at ¶ 6; Mercedes Benz, USA, LLC v. Lewis, No. 19-10948, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
154818, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 11, 2019).
18 Kyle Jahner, Mercedes Fight With Muralists Tests Building Copyright Bounds, BLOOMBERG
(Apr. 23, 2019, 11:35 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/mercedes-fight-with-muraliststests-building-copyright-bounds.
19 Complaint, supra note 17, at ¶ 9.
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In response, Defendant-artists argued that Mercedes failed to state a claim.20
Specifically, Defendants argued that because the murals have not been registered for
copyright yet, the case was not ripe, the AWCPA does not provide exemption for the
photographs of the murals, and finally that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction.21
The court denied Defendants’ motions to dismiss, holding that Mercedes has a
plausible claim for relief and the Court has jurisdiction over all the defendants.22 The
Court was certain to point out that it was not yet ruling on whether Mercedes would
prevail under the AWCPA.23 The Court later ordered all of the proceedings to be
consolidated.24
Part II of this Comment provides background information on the fair use doctrine
and the scope of the Copyright Act; the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act;
and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Part III will analyze the claims for relief
put forth in Mercedes’ complaint and evaluate Defendant-artists’ arguments. Finally,
Part IV proposes how the court should rule in the pending litigation of MBUSA LLC
v. Lewis.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Scope of Fair Use and Copyright Protection
The Copyright Act provides that anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights
of the copyright owner is an infringer of copyright.25 Copyright protection is afforded
to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”26 Works
of authorship include, though are not limited to: literary works, musicals works,
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works (“PGS”), and architectural works.27 Any work
that qualifies under one of these categories is afforded copyright protection as soon as
it is produced.28
The author of the original work is the initial copyright owner.29 As such, the
author controls the exclusive rights to reproduce the work in copies, prepare derivative
works, distribute copies, and in the case of artwork, display the work publicly.30
20 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 4, Mercedes Benz USA LLC v. Bombardier, 2:19-CV-10951AC-EAS, (E.D. Mich. Apr. 24, 2019).
21 Lewis, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154818, at *3.
22 Id.
23 Id. at *18.
24 Mercedes Benz, USA, LLC v. Lewis, No. 19-10948, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166073, at *2-3 (E.D.
Mich. Sep. 26, 2019).
25 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018).
26 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).
27 Id. (“(1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic
works, including any accompanying music;(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;(5) pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works;(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;(7) sound recordings;
and (8) architectural works”).
28 17 U.S.C. § 102.
29 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2018) (the ownership of the copyright “vests initially in the author(s) of the
work” unless or until ownership is transferred).
30 17 U.S.C. § 106.
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However, Section 107 of the Copyright Act limits the exclusive rights that a copyright
owner may claim to their copyrighted work.31 The legal doctrine of fair use permits
unlicensed use of copyright-protected works in “certain circumstances.”32
The question of fair use was long ago dubbed “the most troublesome in the whole
law of copyright.”33 The Copyright Act does not define fair use.34 However, Section 107
sets forth four factors that courts take into consideration:35
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial36 nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;37 (2) the nature
of the copyrighted work;38 (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;39 and (4) the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.40

17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018).
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., More Information On Fair Use, https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/moreinfo.html (last visited Sept. 2019).
33 Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939); WILLIAM T. MCGRATH,
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT, FAIR USE, AND REMEDIES, ILLINOIS INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING LEGAL
EDUCATION § 11.16 (2017) (explaining that “[e]ach case involving a question of fair use requires a
difficult case-by-case balancing of complex factors”).
34 17 U.S.C. § 107.
35 Id.
36 Commercial use can be rather broad; and sometimes the result is to deny fair use. See, e.g.,
World Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, Inc. v. Bozell, 142 F. Supp. 2d 514, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (copyright of
fundraising video for financial gains and notoriety held as commercial use); Rubin v. Boston Magazine
Co., 645 F.2d 80, 84 (1st Cir. 1981) (reproduction of scientific material to “entertain readers of a
magazine of general circulation” held a commercial use); but see Italian Book Corp. v. American Broad.
Cos., 458 F. Supp. 65, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (fair use sustained for television news broadcast containing
portion of plaintiff’s song); Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens For Gallen Comm., 457 F.
Supp. 957, 961 (D.N.H. 1978) (held fair use for political commercial on television containing portion
of plaintiff’s song).
37 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[1][a] (2019). “Under
the first factor, the inquiry in itself does not specify which purposes—beyond the ‘nonprofit
educational’—will tend to render a given use ‘fair,’ and which will not . . . [although Section 107 lists]
certain purposes that are most appropriate for a finding of fair use: ‘criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship or research.’” Id.
38 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994) (explaining that this factor refers
to “‘the value of the materials used’ . . . [and it] calls for recognition that some works are closer to the
core of intended copyright protection than others" and holding that the rock ballad's creative
expression for “public dissemination falls within the core of the copyright's protective purposes”); see,
e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237-238 (1990) (distinguishing fictional short story with factual
works); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 563-564 (1985)
(distinguishing soon-to-be-published memoir with published speech); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-455 (1984)(distinguishing motion pictures with news broadcasts).
39 4 NIMMER, supra note 37, § 13.05[3] (noting the factor of amount of substantiality relates to the
matter of substantial similarity, however, “[th]e proper analysis [] includes a determination of not just
quantitative, but also qualitative substantiality”).
40 4 NIMMER, supra note 37, § 13.05[4]; The effect on Plaintiff’s potential market is “the most
important, and indeed, central fair use factor . . . [because it] poses the issue of whether unrestricted
and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant (whether in fact engaged in by the
defendant or by others) would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market for, or
value of, the plaintiff’s present work.” Id. (citing Wall Data Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dept.,
447 F.3d 769, 781 (9th Cir. 2006)).
31
32
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It follows that the “amount” under the third factor and the extent of permissible
copying varies with the purpose and character of use.41
The problem is that Section 107 does not define the difference between wrongful
and permissible copying or deriving.42 A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or
more preexisting works.43 A common type of derivative work is a “new edition” which
constitutes an original work because of its revisions, annotations, and or
modifications.44 However, for a derivative work to receive copyright protection, it “must
incorporate some or all of a preexisting ‘work’ and add new original copyrightable
authorship to that work.”45
When it comes to works that are classified as public domain,46 the work still
contains underlying material that may become derivative work; and “the use of the
public domain material in a derivative work will not prevent anyone else from using
the same public domain work for another derivative work.”47
B. Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Due to “[c]oncerns about direct and contributory copyright infringement liability
for Internet service providers” Congress enacted The Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (“DMCA”) in 199848 to create “certain limitations on liability for ISPs.”49 The
DMCA establishes safe harbors for four types of activities that service providers
frequently engage in, that would otherwise be subject to copyright liability: (a)
transitory digital network communications, (b) system caching, (c) information
residing on systems or networks at the direction of users, and (d) information location
tools.50

4 NIMMER, supra note 37, § 13.05[3].
4 NIMMER, supra note 37, § 13.05[5].
43 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (examples of derivative works include: “a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast,
transformed, or adapted”).
44 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., Copyright in Derivative Works and Compilations, COPYRIGHT.GOV,
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ14.pdf. (last visited Oct. 2019) [hereinafter Copyright in
Derivative Works].
45 Id. Copyright protection for derivative works “does not extend to any preexisting material, that
is, previously published or previously registered works or works in the public domain or owned by a
third party. As a result, it is not possible to extend the length of protection for a copyrighted work by
creating a derivative work.”
46 Public Domain, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (11th ed. 2019). The Black’s Law Dictionary defines
the word “public domain” as “[t]he universe of inventions and creative works that are not protected
by intellectual-property rights and are therefore available for anyone to use without charge. When
copyright, trademark, patent, or trade-secret rights are lost or expire, the intellectual property they
had protected becomes part of the public domain and can be appropriated by anyone without liability
for infringement.” Id.
47 Copyright in Derivative Works, supra note 44.
48 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, PUB. L. NO. 105-304, 112 STAT. 2860 (1998).
49 MCGRATH, supra note 33, § 11.15; see 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 512, 1201 (2018).
50 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(a)-(d) (2018).
41
42
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As a preliminary matter, to qualify for the safe harbor provisions, Internet service
providers (“ISP”) must “(a) adopt a policy that provides for the termination of service
access for repeat infringers in appropriate circumstances, (b) implement that policy in
a reasonable manner, and (c) inform its subscribers of that policy.”51
The first issue plaguing independent artists concerns user-generated content.52
Popular Internet service providers, such as Facebook, YouTube, and Instagram, may
avoid liability for infringing material posted by their users.53 To avoid liability, the ISP
must first show it does not have actual knowledge of the infringing material or activity,
or is not aware of “facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.”54
If the ISP obtains knowledge or awareness of infringement, it must act
“expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.”55 Next, the ISP must show
that it does not receive a financial benefit for the infringing activity, where “the service
provider has the right and ability to control such activity.”56
If the ISP receives a notification of infringement it must respond “expeditiously to
remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the
subject of infringing activity.”57 Facts or circumstances suggesting there is obvious
infringement have been coined “red-flag[s].”58 Courts have held that an ISP’s general
knowledge that its services could be used for infringement is insufficient to meet the
red-flag requirement.59
The second issue plaguing independent artists concerns removal or alteration of
copyright management information (“CMI”).60 CMI may include information such as
the title, the author, the copyright owner, the terms and conditions for use of the work,
and other identifying information set forth in a copyright notice or conveyed in the
work.61 Courts have interpreted two requirements under this provision: first, the
removal or alteration of the CMI, and second, that the defendant removed or altered
the CMI knowingly or intentionally.62 While the DMCA clearly prohibits intentional

51 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (2018); see, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th
Cir. 2007) (discussing reasonable implementation as a threshold matter); Ellison v. Robertson, 357
F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004)(determining ISP’s eligibility for safe harbor limitations of liability).
52 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2018).
53 Id.
54 Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
55 Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).
56 Id. § 512(c)(1)(B).
57 Id. § 512(c)(1)(C); see also ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 620-625
(4th Cir. 2001)(holding that take-down notice in the cease and desist order was sufficient); Corbis
Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1108 (W.D. Wash. 2004)(holding that third-party
notices were not sufficient to show defendant’s apparent knowledge).
58 Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1108 (noting that “Congress described the advertisement of illegal
copyright activity through such slang words as a ‘red flag’ of obvious infringement, and indicated that
the infringing nature of sites containing such red flags would be apparent from even a ‘brief and casual
viewing’”).
59 Instead, plaintiffs must show that the ISP’s had knowledge of specific and identifiable
infringements. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1021
(9th Cir. 2013); Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012).
60 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b)(1) (2018).
61 See 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b)-(c) (2018).
62 See GC2 Inc. v. International Game Technology, 391 F. Supp. 3d 828, 840 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (citing
Stevens v. CoreLogic, Inc., 899 F.3d 666, 674 (9th Cir. 2018)).
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removal or alteration of CMI, the framing and cropping of a photograph presents a
more novel and nuanced issue.63
C. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act
In 1990, the Copyright Act was amended by the Architectural Works Copyright
Protection Act (“AWCPA”).64 The AWCPA effectively created a new category of
copyrightable work known as "architectural works"65 which includes the design of a
building itself, as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including plans and
drawings, and design elements.66
However, protection offered under the AWCPA is limited. Section 120(a)
addresses pictorial representations of architectural works.67 When the work is located
in a public place, or visible from a public place, anyone may make, distribute, or
publicly display “pictures, paintings, photographs, or other pictorial representations of
the work.”68 While Section 120(b) limits alterations that can be made to the structure
itself,69 the danger is, if murals and other artworks fall under exemption from the
AWCPA, it could incentivize owners to exploit the property.70

III. ANALYSIS
A. Whether Mercedes’ Use of the Murals Satisfies Fair Use
To determine whether Mercedes satisfied the fair use test, the Court will consider:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
63 See 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b)(3) (prohibiting an actor from distributing copyrighted works “knowing
that copyright management information has been removed or altered without authority of the
copyright owner or the law”) (emphasis added).
64 Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 701-706, 104 Stat. 5089,
5133-34 (1990). The law is also codified in sections of title seventeen of the United States Code. See,
e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a)(8), 301.
65 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “architectural work” as “the design of a building as embodied in any
tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings. The work
includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the
design, but does not include individual standard features”).
66 See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
67 17 U.S.C. § 120(a) (2018).
68 Id.
69 17 U.S.C. § 120(b) (stating that the owners of the building where the work is embodied, “may,
without the consent of the author or copyright owner of the architectural work, make or authorize the
making of alterations to such building, and destroy or authorize the destruction of such building”).
Not all works of art that are architectural, are covered under the AWCPA. Namely, the AWCPA does
not apply to landscape design. Even though “is true that both architecture and landscape design
concern the making of a place, [] it is the use of that place at which the line is drawn . . . [a]rchitecture
results in a structure; landscape design results in an image.” John Nivala, The Landscape Art of
Daniel Urban Kiley, 29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 267, 291-292 (2005).
70 Jahner, supra note 18.
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nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.71
1. Is the Purpose and Character of Mercedes’ Use of the Murals Fair?
In its declaratory judgment action, Mercedes admits that its Instagram post
featured six photographs which depicted, in part, “partially obstructed and blurred
image[s] of graffiti art”72 created by the Defendants.73 However, Mercedes argues that
the Instagram post74 “fundamentally transformed the visual aesthetic and meaning of
Defendant[s’] mural[s].”75 To advance this argument, Mercedes contends that the
photographs are action shots that were (i) blurred to highlight the vehicle’s speed, (ii)
depicted at a “steep, oblique angle,” to draw focus to the vehicle and (iii) cropped so
that one-third of the mural is out of frame.76
The meaning behind the post, according to Mercedes, is to showcase the G 500
vehicle as an “off-road vehicle that is always ready for some ‘urban exploration.’”77 In
contrast, the meaning behind the Lewis mural focuses on identity and African
culture.78 Whereas, the Bombardier mural features themes of consumerism and the
human condition.79 Finally, the Gramajo-Soto mural showcases graffiti culture and
“youthful nostalgia.”80
On the other hand, Defendants should focus on the Instagram post as a whole,
and argue that Mercedes did not adequately transform the artists’ original work
because the murals remain instantly recognizable in the post.81 In addition,
Defendants should point out that Mercedes strategically chose the locations for the
promotional photographs for its ad, and chose to photograph its vehicle in front the
murals to add to its theme of “urban exploration.”82
17 U.S.C. § 107.
See Image 1, supra part I.
73 Complaint, supra note 17, at ¶ 22.
74 See Image 2, supra part I.
75 Complaint, supra note 17, at ¶ 25.
76 Complaint, supra note 17, at ¶ 26(a)-(e).
77 Complaint, supra note 17 at ¶ 28.
78 Lindsay Samson, Meet the artist behind America's only museum dedicated to African beads,
DESIGN INDABA (October 25, 2019), https://www.designindaba.com/articles/creative-work/meet-artistbehind-americas-only-museum-dedicated-african-beads (reporting that Lewis’ artwork “tell[s] a story
about black identity and history that connects communities across the world–like his in Detroit–to
the African continent”).
79 See Artists, MURALS IN THE MARKET, https://www.muralsinthemarket.com/denial (last visited
Oct. 2019).
80 See Artists, MURALS IN THE MARKET, https://www.muralsinthemarket.com/jeffsoto (last visited
Oct. 2019).
81 See Graham v. Prince, 265 F. Supp. 3d 366, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (holding that there was no
transformative use where the infringing work simply reproduces the original work with “some de
minimis cropping” and the reasonable observer would recognize the original work in a “side-by-side
comparison”).
82 See id.; but cf. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 2006)(finding that artist had made
fair use of a photograph of a woman's legs by overlaying the legs on a collage featuring three other
71
72
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The Court must also determine whether Mercedes’ use of the murals qualifies as
commercial use. In January 2018, Mercedes unveiled the new G 500 truck at the 2019
North American International Auto Show.83 Mercedes published the Instagram post
at issue in this case on January 26, 2018, in conjunction with the unveiling at the Auto
Show.84 Defendant-artists should argue that the Instagram post is an advertisement
and clearly commercial.85
The primary concern under this sub-factor is unauthorized use by a secondary
user to reap significant revenues as a direct result of copying the original work.86
Mercedes and companies like it undoubtedly make significant revenue from Instagram
advertisement posts featuring their vehicles.87 Yet Mercedes will contend that the
exact revenue obtained from one published post can be difficult to calculate,88 let alone
the revenue resulting from the direct use of an original work.89
2. Does the Natural of the Murals Warrant Copyright Protection?
The second factor focuses on the original work, rather than the alleged
infringement.90 This factor recognizes that some works are closer to the core of
intended copyright protection than others.91 Generally speaking, fair use is more likely
to be found in factual works than fictional works.92 This is because the law recognizes

pairs of women's legs, trays of pastries and ice-cream, "with a grassy field and Niagara Falls in the
background"); Complaint, supra note 17, at ¶ 28.
83 Complaint, supra note 17, at ¶ 17.
84 Complaint, supra note 17, at ¶ 21.
85 See Balsley v. LFP, Inc., 691 F.3d 747, 759 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding defendant’s reproduction of
plaintiff’s photograph was “clearly for commercial purposes” where editors admitted the photo was a
part of a section of the magazine “[that] was added to generate interest, sales, and profits”).
86 Blanch, 467 F.3d at 253 (quoting Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 922 (2d
Cir. 1994)).
87 Mediakix, Influencer Marketing Channels Where US Marketers Plan To Spend The Most, Jan
2019 (% of respondents), EMARKETER (Feb. 14, 2019),
https://www.emarketer.com/chart/226713/influencer-marketing-channels-where-us-marketers-planspend-most-jan-2019-of-respondents (reporting that U.S. marketers spend sixty-nine percent of their
influencer budgets on Instagram); Advertising, Instagram Business,
https://business.instagram.com/advertising/ (last visited Oct. 2019) (explaining the ways to purchase
and use “Stories Ads,” “Photo Ads,” “Video Ads,” “Carousel Ads,” “Collection Ads,” and “Ads in
Explore”); Christina Newberry, Thirty-Seven Instagram Stats That Matter To Marketers In 2020,
HOOTSUITE (October 22, 2019), https://blog.hootsuite.com/instagram-statistics/ (reporting that
“Instagram’s potential advertising reach is $849.3 million users”).
88 Paige Cooper, The Six Best Instagram Analytics Tools (And Metrics You Need To Track),
Hootsuite (May 1, 2019), https://blog.hootsuite.com/instagram-analytics-tools-business/ (reporting
that Instagram eliminated its application programming interface in December 2018 forcing marketers
to rely on third-party analytics tools).
89 Sarah Dowley, Michael Aynsley, How to Prove and Improve Social Media ROI, HOOTSUITE
(Nov. 6, 2018), https://blog.hootsuite.com/measure-social-media-roi-business/#tools (explaining that
social media return on investment “is the sum of all social media actions that create value” and there
is no “catch-all formula for proving ROI”).
90 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(2).
91 Campbell, 510 U.S. 569, 586 (explaining “[t]his factor calls for recognition that some works are
closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others”).
92 Stewart, 495 U.S. at 237.
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a greater need to disseminate factual works to the public.93 The murals are a “creative”
work of art, which Defendant-artists can argue fits squarely within the core of intended
copyright protection and merits strong protection from a fair use defense.94 This factor
will likely be uncontested.95
3. What is the Amount and Substantiality of Mercedes’ Use?
Mercedes argues that the Instagram post incorporates only a minimal amount of
the murals, in the background of the photographs.96 Furthermore, Mercedes contends
that the murals are incidental because they “are not the centerpiece of the photograph
or the series of six photographs” and the murals appear in the photograph “only
because [they were] integrated into the cityscape that [Mercedes] included as part of
the background.”97
However, Defendant-artists can challenge Mercedes’ argument for transformative
use alongside the amount and substantiality.98 Defendants should argue that this
factor weighs in their favor because the photographs in the Instagram post99 feature
two-thirds of the murals;100 and Mercedes retained the full aesthetic appeal of the
murals to promote its theme of “‘urban exploration.’”101
4. Whether Mercedes’ Use of the Murals Effects the Potential Market
Finally, Mercedes argues that the Instagram post does not target the same
audience or the same commercial markets.102 The murals, Mercedes contends, were
created as part of a greater effort to increase tourism and economic development in the

Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563.
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 710 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that where there is no dispute that
a work is creative and published, “this factor weighs against a fair use determination”).
95 4 NIMMER, supra note 37, § 13.05[2][a] (explaining that this factor “typically recedes into
insignificance in the greater fair use calculus”).
96 Complaint, supra note 17, at ¶ 25.
97 Complaint, supra note 17, at ¶ 26(e).
98 Campbell, 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994) (explaining that quantity and quality of the copyrighted
material are “reasonable in relation to purpose of the copying”); see also Graham, 265 F. Supp. 3d 366,
383 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (clarifying that this factor necessarily relates to the degree of which the use was
transformative).
99 See Image 2, supra part I.
100 Cariou, 714 F.3d 694, 710 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that courts must “consider the proportion of
the original work used, and not how much of the secondary work comprises the original”).
101 See Id. at 711 (evaluating whether the quantity and quality were reasonable where the
infringing reproductions superimposed “cartoonish” images onto the original, but were “still similar
in key aesthetic ways”); Blanch, 467 F.3d at 257-258 (holding that the amount of copying was
reasonable in light of defendant’s creative decisions to use the airplane background and to “extract
the legs, feet, and sandals” from the original); Kelly v. Arriba Soft. Corp., 336 F.3d at 821 (9th Cir.
2003) (holding that the factor of amount and substantiality weighs in favor of neither party when
defendant copied the original image as a whole, though the amount was necessary to allow users to
identify the original in the thumbnail).
102 Complaint, supra note 17, at ¶ 32-33.
93
94
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Eastern Market district of Detroit.103 Mercedes does not usurp the potential markets
for the Defendant-artists because the murals were created for the Murals in the
Market Festival.104 Therefore this factor ultimately weighs in favor of Mercedes.
B. Whether Mercedes Violated the DMCA
In support of its argument for non-violation under DMCA, Mercedes alleges that
it did not remove or alter any of Defendants’ copyright management information
(“CMI”) when it published the Instagram post in 2018.105 Alternatively, Mercedes
claims that to any extent that it did remove any CMI, it was not intentional.106
Moreover, Mercedes will point out that despite its intent, where there is no removal or
alteration of CMI, a DMCA claim must fail.107
Mercedes admits that in the published post the photographs were blurred and
one-third of the murals were cropped out of frame.108 While the DMCA clearly prohibits
intentional removal or alteration of CMI, the framing and cropping of a photograph
presents a more novel and complex question.109 Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“alteration” as a “change” in something.110 It defines “removal” as “the transfer or
moving of a person or thing from one location, position, or residence to another.”111 As
it stands, failure to include or omit CMI does not constitute removal or alteration.112
C. Are the Murals Exempt Under AWCPA?
In the Court’s order denying the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court held
that Mercedes has alleged a plausible claim for exemption under section 120(a) of the
AWCPA.113 The question remains, whether or not Mercedes has the right to

About, MURALS IN THE MARKET, supra note 10.
Mercedes, No. 19-10948, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154818, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 11, 2019).
105 Complaint, supra note 17, at ¶ 66.
106 Complaint, supra note 17, at ¶ 67.
107 See 17 U.S.C. § 1202.
108 Complaint, supra note 17, at ¶ 26(a)-(d).
109 See 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b)(3) (prohibiting an actor from distributing copyrighted works “knowing
that copyright management information has been removed or altered without authority of the
copyright owner or the law”) (emphasis added).
110 Alteration, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (11th ed. 2019) (defining the word “immaterial
alteration” as “[a] minor change in something” and “material alteration” as “[a] significant change in
something”).
111 Removal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (11th ed. 2019); see Falkner v. GM, LLC, 393 F. Supp. 3d
927, 938 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (holding that defendant did not remove or alter “Plaintiff's signature from
the photograph; rather, [defendant] simply chose not to include the perpendicular mural wall in his
photograph”).
112 Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 938 (explaining that the purpose of the DMCA was “to prevent the
‘defac[ing] or deform[ing]’ of protected works, such as ‘defacing or altering the title page of a book’ or
‘delet[ing] . . . the electronic information that may accompany a computer file containing a
copyrightable composition.’ (quoting 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12A.10[B][1][a])).
113 Mercedes, No. 19-10948, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154818, at *13-15 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 11, 2019)
(holding that Mercedes properly alleged that the murals were a part of the “architectural work” under
103
104
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photograph the public buildings showcasing defendants’ murals.114 Mercedes’ alleges
that the defendants’ murals are “a part of an architectural work.”115 In support of its
argument, Mercedes contends that each mural was “integrated into the façade of [the]
building and the Detroit cityscape” and “created for a functional purpose.”116
Admittedly, there is no “determinative test” to decide what qualifies a PGS work
as a “part of” an architectural work.117 Courts thus far have considered four factors: (i)
whether the artwork was conceptually integrated into the “underlying architecture,”
(ii) whether the artwork is itself an “architectural feature,” (iii) whether the artwork
is designed to appear as it were a part of the building, or (iv) whether the artwork
serves a functional purpose related to the building.118
The Murals in the Market festival “invites artists from all over the world to
showcase their art style.”119 Defendant-artists will point out that at the end of the 10
days, their artwork becomes a semi-permanent feature of the buildings and the Eastern
Market cityscape of Detroit.120 Defendants will compare Mercedes’ argument to those
raised in Falkner v. General Motors.121 The Falkner court held that murals painted on
the walls of a Detroit parking garage were not a part of the architecture because they
were not a functional feature of the garage, nor were they integrated into the design of
the garage.122 Much like the Falkner murals, Defendants should argue that their
murals serve no functional purpose related to the building, and the murals in fact were
designed to create a “significant visual impact” and the buildings simply serve as a
“platform.”123

120(a); rejecting defendant-artists’ policy argument that 120(a) wiped out all copyright protection for
street art murals; and ruling that defendants’ reliance on Star Athletica was misplaced ).
114 Id. at *16.
115 Complaint, supra note 17, at ¶ 64.
116 Complaint, supra note 17, at ¶ 61-62.
117 Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d 927, 937 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (relying on the factors set forth by the Ninth
Circuit decision in Leicester v. Warner Bros. to determine the “part of” standard for an architectural
work).
118 Id. (citing Leicester v. Warner Bros., 232 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 2000)).
119 Complaint, supra note 17, at ¶ 44.
120 See Emily Sullivan, New York Judge Awards $6.7 Million To 21 Graffiti Artists For Destroyed
Murals,
NPR
(Feb.
13,
2018,
10:35
PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2018/02/13/585416520/new-york-judge-awards-6-7-million-to-21-graffiti-artists-for-destroyedmurals (quoting the real estate developer in the infamous 5Pointz graffiti case where dozens of graffiti
murals were whitewashed overnight: “‘[the artists] knew it wasn’t a permanent thing...[t]hey knew it
was temporary’”).
121 Falkner, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 937.
122 Id. The Court here made a strong factual distinction between the murals in the case at bar,
and the towers in Leicester: “The undisputed facts are wholly unlike those in Leicester that led that
court to determine that the street wall towers were part of the 801 Tower, such as: the matching
decorative design elements, materials, and spacing; the presence of an architectural purpose for the
street wall; and the functional role played by the street wall in serving as a gate to channel foot traffic
into the courtyard. Because the relevant facts in Leicester are entirely distinguishable from those
here, and because the facts in the record tend to establish—if anything—the lack of a relevant
connection between the mural and the parking garage.” Id.
123 About, Murals in the Market, supra note 10.
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IV. PROPOSAL
A. Mercedes’ Use of the Murals was not a Fair Use
Ultimately, Mercedes’ use of murals does not satisfy the four-factor test because:
(i) the purpose and character of Mercedes’ use of the murals is not fair use; (ii) the
nature of the murals warrants copyright protection; (iii) the amount of Mercedes’ use
of the murals is substantial; and (iv) Mercedes’ use of the murals affects the potential
market.
1. The Purpose and Character of Mercedes’ Use of the Murals is Not Fair Use
The Court should find that Mercedes did not adequately transform the artists’
original work either through blurring and cropping, or by changing the meaning or
message.124 The Sixth Circuit should adopt and apply the “‘reasonable viewer’” test to
determine whether Mercedes’ Instagram post is truly a transformative use of
Defendant-artists’ murals.125 After performing a side-by-side comparison of the murals
and Mercedes’ Instagram post, the Court should find that the photographs in the
Instagram post do not obscure or alter the murals such that murals are “‘barely
recognizable.’”126
The Court should also find that Mercedes did not truly transform the meaning or
message in the published post.127 In fact, Mercedes strategically chose the locations for
the promotional photographs for its ad, and chose to photograph its vehicle in front of
the murals to add to its theme of “urban exploration.”128 Thus, Mercedes relied upon
the urban setting of the murals, capitalized on the success of the murals, and exploited
the Murals In the Market festival to promote its new vehicle.129
Moreover, the Court should find that Mercedes’ use of the murals qualifies as
commercial use. The point here "is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary
gain but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material

124 See Graham, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 381 (holding that there was no transformative use where the
infringing photograph simply reproduces the entirety of the original artwork with “some de minimis
cropping”).
125 Id. at 380 (citing Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706).
126 Id. (quoting Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710).
127 Campbell, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (explaining that transformative use may “add[] something new,
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or
message”); see also Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 177 (2d Cir. 2018) (noting
that “use of copyrighted material that 'merely repackages or republishes the original' is unlikely to be
deemed a fair use” (quoting Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 1998));
Calibrated Success, Inc. v. Charters, 72 F. Supp. 3d 763, 771 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (holding defendant’s
work not transformative where defendant downloaded and sold copies of plaintiff’s entire instructional
car video and did not communicate a new message to the viewer).
128 Complaint, supra note 17, at ¶ 28.
129 Complaint, supra note 17, at ¶ 4 (Mercedes commissioned the series of photographs of the G
500 driving through the streets of Detroit with the caption: “‘This off-road legend is always ready for
some urban exploration to mix things up’”).
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without paying the customary price.”130 In the case at bar, Mercedes’ sole motivation
was to use the murals, depicted in the photographs of the published Instagram post,
to advertise its new vehicles.131 The published post did not use the murals for
educational purposes, nor did it add commentary.
2. The Natural of the Murals Warrants Copyright Protection
The court should find in favor of Defendant-artists on this factor. The purpose of
protection under the Copyright Act is to protect science and the arts.132 The original
works at issue here are murals painted onto the façade of several buildings in
Detroit.133 The murals are “creative” works of art that fit squarely within the core of
intended copyright protection.134 Therefore, the Court should find that the nature of
the work merits strong protection from a fair use defense.
3. The Amount of Mercedes’ Use of the Mural is Substantial
Mercedes would have the Court believe that the murals depicted in the Instagram
photos are merely featured as background of the “cityscape” which is secondary to the
main focal point, the vehicle.135 However, the Court should find that Mercedes’
argument under amount and substantiality fails.136 This factor should weigh in favor
of the artists because the photographs in the Instagram post137 feature two-thirds of
the murals;138 and Mercedes retained the full aesthetic appeal of the murals to promote
its theme of “‘urban exploration.’”139

130 Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, 99 F.3d 1381, 1400 (6th Cir. 1996)
(quoting Harper & Row, Publrs. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985)).
131 See Complaint, supra note 17, at ¶ 21; see Image 2, supra part I.
132 Campbell, 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (recognizing that the purpose of copyright is to "to promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts” which includes “some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted
materials") (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
133 Mercedes, No. 19-10948, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154818, at *4-5 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 11, 2019).
134 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 710 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that where there is no dispute that
the series of portraits and landscape photographs were creative and published, and thus “this factor
weighs against a fair use determination”).
135 Complaint, supra note 17, at ¶ 26(e).
136 Campbell, 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994) (explaining that quantity and quality of the copyrighted
material are “reasonable in relation to purpose of the copying”); see also Ringgold v. Black
Entertainment TV, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that defendant’s use was not de
minimis copying where plaintiff’s poster was visible to the “average lay observer” in the background
of a television program for 26.75 seconds); Graham, 265 F. Supp. 3d 366, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
(clarifying that this factor necessarily relates to the degree of which the use was transformative).
137 See Image 2, supra part I.
138 Cariou, 714 F.3d 694, 710 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that courts must “consider the proportion of
the original work used, and not how much of the secondary work comprises the original”).
139 See id. at 711 (evaluating whether the quantity and quality were reasonable where the
infringing reproductions superimposed “cartoonish” images onto the original, but were “still similar
in key aesthetic ways”); Blanch, 467 F.3d at 257 (holding that the amount of copying was reasonable
in light of defendant’s creative decisions to use the airplane background and to “extract the legs, feet,
and sandals” from the original); Kelly, 336 F.3d at 821 (holding that the factor of amount and
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4. Mercedes’ Use of the Murals Affects the Potential Market
Finally, the Court should find that Mercedes’ use of the murals in the Instagram
post affects the Defendant-artists’ potential market. Mercedes claims it did not usurp
the potential markets for the Defendant-artists because the murals were created for
the Murals in the Market festival.140 However, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that a
copyright owner’s current desire or ability to profit from the market is immaterial to
the court’s analysis for a potential effect on the market.141
Defendant-artists’ potential markets include, and are not limited to, selling or
licensing photographs of the murals for advertising, or selling photographs to other
websites, such as a stock-photo database.142 The Court should recognize that in the
prosperous age of digital advertising, once the original work has been reproduced
online it can be difficult if not impossible to control; and to permit Mercedes’ use of the
murals incentivizes widespread piracy of an artist’s original work.143
B. Mercedes Did Not Violate DMCA
The Court should find here that Mercedes did not violate the DMCA. Mercedes
admits that in the published post the photographs were blurred and one-third of the
murals were cropped out of frame.144 While the DMCA clearly prohibits intentional
removal or alteration of CMI, the framing and cropping of a photograph presents a

substantiality weighs in favor of neither party when defendant copied the original image as a whole,
though the amount was necessary to allow users to identify the original in the thumbnail).
140 Mercedes, No. 19-10948, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154818, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 11, 2019).
141 Balsley, 691 F.3d at 761 (holding defendant’s use of copyrighted photograph had potential
effect on market even when plaintiffs had no intention of accessing the market); see also Ashley
Furniture Industries v. American Signature, Inc., No. 2:11-cv-427, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197503, at
*35 (holding that plaintiff’s market was solely to sell furniture, not photographs of furniture, therefore
it had no potential market).
142 Kelly, 336 F.3d at 821 (explaining that artist “could sell or license his photographs to other
web sites or to a stock photo data-base, which then could offer the images to its customers”); see e.g.,
What We Do, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 19,
2020)(providing licenses and public domain tools to users to “ensure proper attribution; and allow
others to copy, distribute, and make use of those works”).
143 See FameFlynet, Inc. v. Jasmine Enterprises, 344 F. Supp. 3d 906, 913 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (noting
that photojournalism company “loses the ability to control [a] photograph's exclusivity, and that the
value of a photograph is usually diminished when a photo is leaked” and aggregate use creates a
“major inroad on copyright”); Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1182 (9th Cir. 2012)
(holding that “[u]nrestricted and widespread reproduction of [the couple’s] [wedding] would not only
undermine the ability of celebrities to market images of themselves, but would also create incentives
to pirate intellectual property”).
144 Complaint at ¶ 26(a)-(d), Mercedes Benz, USA, LLC v. Lewis, No. 19-10948, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 154818 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 11, 2019).
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more novel and nuanced issue.145 However, as it stands, failure to include or omit CMI
does not constitute removal or alteration.146
C. The Murals Are Not Exempt Under the AWCPA
Lastly, the Court should find that the murals are not exempt under the AWCPA.
To determine whether artwork can be a part of a building’s architecture, courts
consider: (i) whether the artwork was conceptually integrated into the “underlying
architecture;” (ii) whether the artwork is itself an “architectural feature;” (iii) whether
the artwork is designed to appear as it were a part of the building; and (iv) whether
the artworks serves a functional purpose related to the building.147
Mercedes’ argument is nearly identical to those raised in Falkner v. General
Motors LLC.148 The court held that the murals painted on the walls of the Detroit
parking garage were not a part of the architecture because they were not a functional
feature of the garage, nor were they integrated into the design of the garage.149 In fact,
the artists were granted “complete creative freedom with respect to the mural.”150 Not
to mention, “the architecture of the parking garage and accompanying building were
already complete before Plaintiff started painting.”151
Turning to the case at bar, while it is true that the murals were created to
“improve the visual appearance of the city and enhance the appeal of the Eastern
Market to tourists,”152 there is no evidence to suggest that the murals hold a functional
purpose related to the building itself.153 Granting Mercedes relief under the AWCPA
would set a dangerous precedent that would allow companies to exploit the commercial
value of street art.154
V. CONCLUSION
The controversy before the Court stems from an Instagram post published by
Mercedes, depicting in whole or in part, Defendant-artists’ murals.155 After Defendant145 See 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b)(3) (prohibiting an actor from distributing copyrighted works “knowing
that copyright management information has been removed or altered without authority of the
copyright owner or the law”) (emphasis added).
146 Falkner v. GM, LLC, 393 F. Supp. 3d 927, 938 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (holding that CMI was not
sufficiently “removed or altered” when Defendant took the photograph from an angle that rendered
the artist’s signature not visible).
147 Id. (citing Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1217)).
148 Id. at 937.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Complaint, supra note 17, at ¶ 48.
153 See Leicester, 232 F.3d at 1218 (holding in part that the streetwall towers at issue “serv[ed]
the functional purpose of channeling traffic into the courtyard, as metal gates, which open and close
for control, latch onto the lantern towers).
154 Jahner, supra note 18 (quoting defendant-artists’ attorney Jeff Gluck: “‘If companies could go
outside and pick and choose artwork to sell their product without asking, it would discourage creating
outdoor art, and we stand to lose an important and beautiful part of their culture’”).
155 Lewis, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154818, at *4-5.
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artists threatened to file suit, Mercedes removed the photos from Instagram as a
“‘courtesy.’”156 Now Mercedes seeks judgments declaring that their photographs of the
G 500 truck in front of the buildings featuring the murals do not infringe the artists’
rights.157 In its complaint, Mercedes asserts (1) non-infringement, (2) fair use, (3)
exemption under the AWCPA, (4) and non-violation of the DMCA.158
The Court should find that Mercedes’ use of Defendant-artists’ murals do not
qualify as fair use. Mercedes’ use of the murals is not transformative and is
undoubtedly commercial in nature.159 Mercedes’ use is substantial and affects the
artists’ potential market.160 Next, the Court should find in favor of Mercedes for
non-violation of the DMCA. Defendant-artists have not offered sufficient evidence to
show that Mercedes intentionally removed or altered copyright management
material.161
Lastly, the Court should hold that the murals are not a part of the architecture,
thus the exemption under the AWCPA does not apply.162 Taken together, this decision
primarily favors Defendant-artists in order to discourage future, widespread
exploitation of artwork created by independent artists by large corporations. Judgment
for the artists in this case will hopefully force companies like Mercedes to ask
permission before reproducing an artist’s work to promote their brand.163

Complaint, supra note 17 at ¶ 6.
Lewis, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154818, at *2.
158 Complaint, supra note 17, at ¶ 9.
159 See Graham, 265 F. Supp. 3d 366, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2017); see also Ashley Furniture, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 197503, at *27-28 (holding that use of photos of a competing product for comparative
advertising was transformative); Gordon v. Nextel Communs., No. 00-73201, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25048, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 13, 2001) (holding that defendant’s television ad was commercial but
plaintiff’s illustrations were not the focus of the ad, which was sending and receiving messages while
using defendant’s service).
160 See Cariou, 714 F.3d 694, 710 (2d Cir. 2013); Audio Visual Productions v. Perini Building Co.,
91 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1086 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (holding that if “photographs intended for use in litigation
could be freely copied without payment to or permission from the copyright holder, there soon would
cease to be any viable marketplace for such works”); Kelly, 336 F.3d at 821 (explaining that artist’s
potential market includes attracting “internet users to his web site, where he sells advertising space
as well as books and travel packages . . . [and] sell[ing] or licens[ing] his photographs to other web
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